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In a number which is dedicated to the celebration of the bicen-
tennial of the University of Pennsylvania it is only natural that the
historical aspect of the law should be stressed. From this standpoint,
however, the Restatement of the Law of Torts by the American Law
Institute does not, at first sight, offer very promising material, for, as
we have been frequently told, of all the major branches of the law, that
dealing with delictual liability has developed to the most striking degree
in recent time and ought to be the least controlled by the authority of
the past. The learning concerning the historical forms of action can
now, it is said, be safely consigned to the legal lumber room as it is no
longer of practical significance. Even the established names of the
various torts and the classifications based on them are to be abandoned
so that the realities of the situation, correctly representing the "factual
set-up", can be made clear.
If this view represents a true picture of the legal position at the
present time then we ought to .be prepared to find fundamental differ-
ences between the American and the English law of torts. For over
a century and a half there has been no political connection between the
two countries, and, at various times of special antagonism, conscious
attempts have been made to limit the influence of one on the other.'
Of even greater importance is the fact that throughout this period the
* This article is a sequel to articles on Volumes one and two of the Restatement,
by Professor Goodhart, appearing in 83 PA. L. Ray. at 411-424 and 968-996.
t B. A., 1912, Yale; LL. B., 1914, LL. D., 1931, Cambridge; D. C. L., 1931, Ox-
ford; author of ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW (1931) ; PRECE-
DENT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1934); editor, LAW QUARTERLY REMVEW;
Professor of Jurisprudence and Fellow, University College, Oxford.
I. Especially after the American Revolution. See POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 136.
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social and the economic conditions in England and America have
shown striking contrasts which have become less marked only in the
present century. If the economic interpretation of legal history is
true to the extent that some of its adherents have claimed for it, then
the divergences in the law ought to be more marked than the resem-
blances. When we turn from these material factors to the spiritual
influences, such as the judges' prejudices and digestions to which such
frequent references are made, the dissimilarity is equally obvious;
most English judges, if we may rely on their portraits, have suffered
from high blood pressure, while the Americans have been thin and
dyspeptic. On all these grounds we ought therefore reasonably expect
to find that, in spite of the fact that the American and English law
of torts have come from the same roots, they have now developed in
entirely separate ways.
Strangely enough, however, a comparison of the two systems
seems to show that the exact opposite is true. In no topic covered
by the recent Restatement is there a major divergence between the
English and the American law, and some of the minor differences are
more apparent than real. It is a striking fact that a law student who
had studied the law of torts only in the American Restatement would
have no difficulty in passing an English examination on this subject,
although occasionally his dogmatic statements on doubtful points might
surprise his examiners. This would be due to the fact that the Amer-
ican Law Institute has necessarily presented its rules in more positive
terms than would be possible for an English text-book writer who
might not be able to find a precedent covering a particular point.
This similarity between the two systems does not mean, however,
that a comparison between them is without value, for it may serve
two purposes. In the first place it may help to clarify points in the
law which are still doubtful. The English lawyer will, in particular,
be able to refer to the Restatement on questions which have either
not as yet arisen or which are still unsettled in his country. In this
connection it is interesting to note that recent English text-books con-
tain an increasing number of references to the Restatements.2 In the
second place, when there is a definite conflict of legal rules the reader's
attention will be called to the possibility that a reform in one or other
of the systems is desirable. Thus there are certain American prin-
ciples, especially in the law of negligence, which seem to be more in
consonance with modern needs than are the traditional English ones.
On the other hand, a few of the changes that have been made in the
2. In particular see SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS (9th ed. 1936) ; WINFIELD, TEXT-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT (937).
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American law seem to be of uncertain value, although this doubt may
be due to a conservative prejudice against innovations. But the differ-
ences are, as has been said, astonishingly few in number, and no one
of them is of fundamental importance. Occasionally we are even left
with a feeling of regret that American law had not been more venture-
some; if it had only swept away some of the unnecessary technicalities,
as, for example, the difference between libel and slander, it would be
easier to argue that such reforms should also be introduced into English
law. We must therefore guard against the feeling of undue com-
placency which is based on the ground that the two systems resemble
each other so closely. It does not follow that the English and the
American rules are necessarily right because they are identical. That
is certainly not the impression which we wish to give in the following
pages.
ANI MALS
The similarity between English and American law is nowhere
more vividly illustrated than in Chapter 20 of the Restatement which
deals with the liability of possessors of animals, for nearly all the
historical anomalies and technicalities of the English law can be found
here. With all respect, the Institute seems to have incorporated even
the errors in emphasis which until recently confused the English law
on this subject. Thus it places liability for animals under the heading
of "Absolute Liability" although this is true only in certain special
circumstances. It is not until the last section 3 on this topic is reached
that the reader discovers that the ordinary rules concerning negligence
are applicable to domestic animals which are not normally dangerous.
How misleading this approach may be is illustrated by the recent
English case of Adhar v. United Dairies (London), Ltd.,4 which
has finally put the English law on a satisfactory basis. The facts can
be stated shortly. The plaintiff, when walking along the pavement,
was attacked and bitten by the defendant's horse which, attached to a
milk-cart, had been left unattended for a considerable period. The
trial judge held that although there was evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendants in leaving the horse unattended for so long a
time, nevertheless they could not be held liable as they had no knowl-
edge that it had a propensity to bite people. In so holding he was
following the often quoted statement of Willes, J., in Cox v. Bur-
bidge r that: "As to animals which are not naturally of a mischievous
disposition, the owner is not responsible for injuries of a personal
3. REsTATFmENT, TORTS (1938) § 518.
4. [I94o] i K. B. 507.
5. 13 C. B. N. S. 43o, 439, 143 Eng. Rep. R. 17I, i74 (1863).
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nature done by them, unless they are shown to have acquired some
vicious or mischievous habit or propensity, and the owner is shown
to have been aware of the fact". The Court of Appeal, however,
reversed the judgment on the ground that the defendants had been
negligent in placing a strain on the pony's temper and that therefore
they were liable for all the direct and ordinary consequences of their
negligence. The fact that the defendants did not know that the pony
had a propensity to bite was immaterial as scienter is unnecessary
where the liability is for negligence. It is clear therefore that in
English law the liability of the possessor of an animal may fall into
one of four classes. First, he is liable for the ordinary consequences
of his negligence if he has failed to control the animal according to
the standards of a reasonable man. Secondly, he is liable for the
trespasses of his cattle. Thirdly, if the animal is ferae naturae, as in
the case of a tiger, he is strictly liable for any injury done by it even
though he has used all reasonable care in guarding it. Fourthly, if the
possessor of a domestic animal knows that it has a specially dangerous
propensity, then he becomes strictly liable if the animal commits an
injury owing to that propensity. It is only in this fourth case that
the element of scienter is essential. The American law concerning
liability for animals is divided into these same four categories, but by
placing them all under the heading of "Absolute Liability" the Restate-
ment tends to obscure the liability for ordinary negligence which under
modern conditions is probably the most important class today.
Perhaps no better illustration of the historical continuity of the
law can be found than in the fact that the rule concerning cattle trespass
which is one of the oldest in legal history 6 should have been trans-
planted to and still be flourishing in modern America. So similar are
the rules that even the peculiar English exception concerning dogs and
cats is mirrored in American law. The Restatement states that this
exception is based on the ground that these animals are difficult to
restrain and are unlikely to do any substantial harm, but it is more
probable that the true explanation can be found in the peculiar historical
rule that at common law the possessor of a dog or a cat did not have
any property in them.7
On one point concerning cattle trespass the Restatement is more
definite and certain than is the English law. It says that ". . . if
otherwise adequate fences are negligently or intentionally broken down
by a third person, or destroyed by a convulsion of nature, and as a
result the livestock escape and enter another's land, their possessor is
6. See WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOp ANIMALS (1939) C. XI.
7. Cf. Buckle v. Holmes, [1926] 2 K. B. 125, 42 L. Q. REv. 146; WILLIAMS, Op.
cit. supra note 6 at 137-46.
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liable". This was probably the old English law,9 but in a modern
Irish case 10 the defendant succeeded where he showed that the trespass
of his cattle was due to the negligent act of a third party in leaving a
gate open. Of this case Professor Winfield says that ". . . the older
authorities are baffling in their vacillations on the soundness of this
defence, but at the present day it ought as a matter of bare justice to
be accepted"."1 We find some difficulty in following his reasoning
here as there seems to be no injustice in holding the possessor liable
even though he was completely innocent: either he or his neighbor
must suffer the loss, so why should it not fall on him? Moreover, the
American rule is more consistent with the basic assumption of this
principle: as liability for cattle trespass is based on possession and not
on fault it is illogical to hold that the act of a third party should be a
defence.
On the other hand, the rule concerning damages as stated in the
Restatement seems to go further than does the English one. The
possessor is said to be liable for any harm done by the animals
1" . while upon the land to any legally protected interest of the
possessor [of the land] or a member of his household even though the
harm is of a sort which the possessor of the livestock had no reason
to expect that they would do . . .,,.12 There is no English case
which extends this type of liability to members of the landowner's
family, nor does there seem to be any reason why it should be so
extended. If members of the household may recover in such circum-
stances, why should not a similar right be given to visitors and em-
ployees? Nor does the English rule extend to all harm done by the
animal, but is limited to that which is not too remote. In determining
this, the propensity of the animal to do the particular kind of damage
which was in fact done is relevant as connecting the injury with the
trespass.18
Both the American and the English law provide that the possessor
of a wild animal is strictly liable for any harm done by it. The
Restatement defines a wild animal as ". . . an animal which is not
by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the
place in which it is kept". 14 Dr. Glanville Williams has pointed out,
that if this definition were ". . . literally applied, it would make a
8. RFSTATEZAMENT, TORTS (1938) § 504, comment e.
9. Y. B. Mich. 20 Edw. IV, f. io b., pl. io (1481) (Bro. Trespass 345).
io. McGibbon v. McCarry, 43 Ir. L. T. R. 132 (I99); cf. WILLIAMS, op. Cit.
supra note 6 at 181-4.
it. WiNFrELD, op. cit. supra note 2 at 547.
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 504, comment e.
13. Cf. Lee v. Riley, 18 C. B. N. S. 722, i44 Eng. Rep. R. 629 (1865); Ellis
v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. io C. P. 10 (874).
14. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) §506 (1).
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person strictly liable for the depredations of his pet rabbits. For such
an extension of strict liability there would certainly be no English
authority".J' Under this definition any strange animal must be classed
as wild, however domestic it may be in the country from which it was
brought. The English law applies a different test, the Court of Appeal
holding in the recent case of McQuaker v. Goddard 16 that a camel was
a domestic animal, even though it was not indigenous to this country.
Scott, L. J. said: "If an animal does not exist in a wild state in any
part of the world, it has ceased altogether to be a wild animal, whether
[it is] in England or in any other country". 17  This case can be dis-
tinguished from Filburn v. People's Palace Co.,' 8 in which the Court
of Appeal held that a domesticated elephant must be classed as a wild
animal, on the ground that elephants exist in a wild state and in that
state they are dangerous. In his recent article 19 Dr. Williams has
suggested that the traditional English and American approach to this
problem is incorrect as the distinction between wild animals and
domestic animals is relevant only to the law of property and not to the
law of scienter. According to him, the question is not whether an
animal is normally wild, but whether it is normally dangerous.
The Institute's rule that a possessor of a wild animal is absolutely
liable to all persons except to trespassers on his land 20 may or may
not be true of English law. It is not clear whether an invitee or a
licensee, who goes on the land knowing that a wild animal is in cap-
tivity there, does not assume the risk of its escape. This question may
be of practical importance in the case of circuses or zoos. On this
point Dr. Williams says: "Indeed, as regards strict liability in scienter
one may go farther, and suggest that a visitor to a zoo by the mere
fact of his going there voluntarily assumes the risk of an inevitable
accident".
2 1
The Restatement provides that the possessor of a wild or danger-
ous animal is liable even though the harm would not have occurred
but for the unexpectable innocent, negligent or reckless act of a third
person.22  It expresses no opinion as to whether the rule is applicable
where the third person intends to bring about the harm. It is difficult
to see why there should be an exception in the latter case. The pos-
sessor of the wild animal, having created a dangerous situation, is
really in the position of an insurer, and there seems to be no reason
15. Williams, The Camel Case (940) 56 L. Q. REV. 354, 355, n. 5.
I6. [1940] i K. B. 687.
17. Id. at 696.
18. 25 Q. B. D. 258 (i89o).
Ig. Williams, note i5 supra at 36o.
20. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 507.
21. Williams, note 15 supra at 360, n. 15.
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) §5io (a).
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why he, unlike all other insurers, should not be held liable even though
a third person has intentionally caused the loss. The English law on
this question is not clear. In Baker v. Snell 23 the Court of Appeal
apparently held that the possessor of a dangerous dog was liable for
the injury it had done even though it had been unchained by a third
person. This case has been severely criticized by the text-book
writers, 24 but it is doubted whether the criticisms are sound. Thus
the learned editor of Salmond on Torts says that ". . since the
keeping of a dangerous animal, even though a wild beast, is not in
itself a wrongful act, he who takes all reasonable care to prevent it
from doing mischief should not be responsible for the wrongful act
of a stranger in letting it loose, or inciting it to evil deeds " 25
If this argument is carried to its logical conclusion, it leads to the
result that the possessor who has taken reasonable care to prevent the
animal from doing mischief ought never to be held liable. This nega-
tives the whole principle of absolute liability, and reduces it to the
ordinary rules of negligence.
On the effect of contributory fault the Restatement provides 26
that a plaintiff is not barred from recovery by his failure to exercise
reasonable care to avoid harm, but that he is barred if he unreasonably
subjects himself to the risk that the dangerous animal will do him
harm. In English law voluntary assumption of risk is a defence,
27
but it is not clear whether a plaintiff who has been guilty of con-
tributory negligence can recover. On principle he ought not to be
able to do so as contributory negligence bars the plaintiff's right to
recovery even where the defendant has-been guilty of the breach of a
statute specially enacted for the plaintiff's benefit.28  If a man could
easily avoid the threatened harm why should he be entitled to recover?
The American distinction between contributory negligence and volun-
tary assumption of risk must be a difficult one to draw in practice. If
A, seeing a tiger in the street, voluntarily and unnecessarily leaves the
shelter of his house, is this contributory negligence or voluntary
assumption of risk?
ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES
Chapter 21 of the Restatement which is concerned with ultra-
hazardous activities is a conveniently short one. In English law this
23. [1908] 2 K. B. 285.
24. SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 562 n. (d); WINFIELD, Op. cit. supra note 2
at 563.
25. SALMOND, op. cit supra note 2 at 561.
26. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §515 (I), (2).
27. Marlor v. Ball, 16 T. L. R. 239 (C. A. i9oo) ; Sylvester v. S. B. Chapman
Ltd., 79 Sol. J. 777 (935).
28. Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ltd., [194o] A. C. 152.
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subject, usually dealt with under the rubric of the Rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher,29 fills a large number of pages in the text-books. Many of
these are occupied with the question whether this liability is a branch
of negligence or of nuisance or constitutes an independent head; but
no definite conclusion is ever reached.
The comment in Chapter 21 wisely avoids this problem, and makes
it clear that this type of liability is based on broad general grounds and
is not limited to activities carried on by the possessors of land.30 Thus
the rule is as applicable to dynamite which is being transported in a
motor truck as it is to dynamite stored in a building. The same view
was taken by Fletcher Moulton, L. J., when he said that the rule
applies in all cases ". . . where by the excessive use of some private
right a person has exposed his neighbour's property or person to
danger . . .,,' but this broad principle is rarely stated by the author-
ities.32 English law on this point is still largely based on particular
instances.
The Restatement provides that an activity is ultrahazardous if it
involves a risk of serious harm and "is not a matter of common
usage". 3 3  But will common usage always prevent an activity from
being ultrahazardous? Ought not the test to be whether it is reasonable
for a person to subject his neighbors to such a risk? In answering
this question common usage is some evidence that the activity is reason-
able but it is not conclusive. Similarly in the law of negligence it is
not the common man but the reasonable man who furnishes the standard
by which the quality of the act is measured. If it became common
usage for persons to store dynamite on their land, would this make
the act less hazardous? In its comment 34 the Restatement distin-
guishes between automobiles and aeroplanes primarily on the ground
that the one is a common and the other an uncommon means of trans-
portation. With all respect, it is doubted whether it is the common
usage which is the essential point here; it is the difference in the degree
and reasonableness of the danger incurred, rather than the number of
persons engaged in motoring and aviation, which marks the distinction
between these activities. The English law on this point is equally
doubtful. Lord Cairns in his judgment in Rylands v. Fletcher35
drew a distinction between natural and non-natural user of land which
has been followed in many subsequent cases. There is much to be
29. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
30. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 510, comment b.
31. Wing v. L. G. 0. Co., [19o9] 2 K. B. 652, 665.
32. But see SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 577, and cases cited there in note (f).
33. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §520 (a), (b).
34. Id. § 520, comment g.
35. L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 338 (1868).
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said for Sir John Salmond's view that this distinction is "unreal". 36
Is the construction of a reservoir a natural or non-natural user of
land? In Rylands v. Fletcher the House of Lords held that it was a
non-natural user and that therefore the landowner was absolutely liable,
but in the Restatement the Institute in a caveat 37 refuses to express an
opinion whether the construction of such a reservoir is an ultra-
hazardous activity or not. If the question in such a case were whether
it is reasonable for a landowner to subject his neighbors to such a risk,
then the answer would depend not on any arbitrary distinction between
natural and non-natural user, but on the facts of each case.
On one point the American law seems to be more certain and
more logical than is the English. Section 522 provides that a person
carrying on an ultrahazardous activity is liable even though the harm
is caused by the act of a third person, or of an animal or by the opera-
tion of a force of nature. This is a reasonable conclusion as the person
who has created the dangerous situation ought to be responsible for
all the consequences which flow from it. The English law, however,
is uncertain on this point, because the Courts, instead of dealing with
the question from the standpoint of general principle, have spent their
time discussing a series of doubtful precedents. The difficulty began
with Blackburn, J.'s judgment in Fletcher v. Rylands,38 in which, after
stating that the defendant was absolutely liable for anything likely to
do mischief, he added: "He can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff's default; or, perhaps, that the escape
was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing
of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to imagine what excuse would
be sufficient". Eight years later in Nichols v. Marsland 39 the Court
of Appeal held that the defendant, who had constructed a series of
artificial lakes, was not liable when the dams gave way owing to a
flood which was so great that it could not reasonably have been an-
ticipated. The Court stressed the point that making a reservoir was
not a wrongful act itself, ". . . but the making it and suffering the
water to escape, if damage ensue, constitute a wrong". 40 However,
if the real cause of the escaping was the act of God or the Queen's
enemies without any fault on the part of the defendant then, Mellish,
L. J., said, he could not ". . . be properly said to have caused or
allowed the water to escape. . ,, 41 The Court, obsessed by the
then prevalent idea that tortious liability must be based on fault, thus
36. SALMOND, LAW O TORTS (6th ed. 1924) § 6I (7), n. (g).
37. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 520, Caveat to comment c on clause (a).
38. L. R. i Ex. 265, 279 (1866). (Italics added.)
39. 2 Ex. D. I (1876).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Ibid.
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limited the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in a way which if followed to
its logical conclusion would virtually have destroyed its efficacy except
in a strictly limited number of cases. Three years later in Box v.
Jubb 42 the process was carried further when the Exchequer Division,
citing Nichols v. Marsland, held that the defendants were not liable
for the escape of water caused by a stranger over whom they had no
control. Here again emphasis was placed on the fact that there had
been no default or breach of duty on the part of the defendants. It
was on the authority of these two cases that the Privy Council based
its judgment in Rickards v. Lothian.48 A lavatory basin in the de-
fendant's building overflowed owing to the malicious act of a third
person, and injured the plaintiff's goods. The Court held that the
Rylands v. Fletcher principle did not apply in these circumstances as
the proper supply of water to a house was not only a reasonable but
almost a necessary feature of town life, and therefore it would be
unreasonable to hold the occupier absolutely liable when he was acting
in an ordinary and proper manner. The Court, however, went further
and held that in any circumstances the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher did
not apply to damage caused by the wrongful acts of third persons.
This case is the high water-mark of the attempt to introduce the idea
of fault into the absolute liability doctrine. But the House of Lords
reaffirmed the original principle when it held in Greenock Corporation
v. Caledonian Ry.4 4 that a flood of extraordinary violence was not a
defence. Although Nichols v. Marsland was not definitely overruled, it
was distinguished almost out of existence. Their Lordships left unan-
swered the question whether a miracle would excuse the defendant;
nothing less than this would be sufficient. Finally, in Northwestern
Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co.45 the Privy
Council held that although the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was not
applicable where the damage was caused by the "conscious or de-
liberate" 46 act of a third person, nevertheless a defendant might be
held liable in negligence in failing to foresee and guard against the
consequences of such acts. From this welter of cases it is impossible
to extract any consistent principle, but this is hardly surprising, for the
judges have been so busy citing precedents that they have failed to
consider on what ground the doctrine of absolute liability is based.
Fortunately the whole question is still open for consideration by the
42. 4 Ex. D. 76 (1879).
43. [1913] A. C. 263.
44. [19171 A. C. 556.
45. [1936] A. C. io8.
46. Id. at 119. No reason is given why the defense is limited to the conscious
or deliberate acts of a third person and does not include negligent acts. This dis-
tinction seems to be difficult to justify as the defendant has no more control over
the negligent acts of a third person than he has over his intentional ones.
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House of Lords, and it is to be hoped that when it falls for decision by
them they will follow the rule set out in the Restatement.
DECEIT
Although the tort of deceit is a comparatively recent one, having
first originated as an independent tort in Pasley v. Freeman (i789) ,
the English and the American rules on this subject seem to be almost
identical. Both have been careful to restrict this type of liability so
as not to set a standard which is higher than the current morality.
Absolute good faith is not required, and sharp practices, which are not
actually dishonest, are not prevented by the law.
The American law seems, however, to be stricter than the English
in one desirable respect, for there is a duty to disclose a latent defect
if the vendor knows that the buyer will assume that, except for faults
discoverable by reasonable inspection, the thing is as it appears to be. 48
On the other hand, the English rule has been stated by Anson as fol-
lows: "Caveat emptor is the ordinary rule in contract. A vendor is
under no liability to communicate the existence even of latent defects
in his wares unless by act or implication he represents such defects not
to exist". 49 Thus in Ward v. Hobbs 50 it was held that a vendor who
had sent to a public market pigs which were to his knowledge suffering
from typhoid fever was not guilty of fraud. Whether such a result
is consonant with modern ideas of commercial morality is, at least,
doubtful.
Both English and American law provide that the maker of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability ". . . only to those
persons to whom it is made with the intent to cause them to act in
reliance upon it . . .",51 but the American law seems to interpret the
word "intent" in a wider sense than do the English authorities. Thus
in the comment to Section 531 it is said that a person intends a result
if he "acts believing that there is a substantial certainty that such a
result will follow from his conduct". 2 It is not clear what is meant by
"a substantial certainty"; in practice it must be difficult to draw a line
between this and a probability. A business company issues a prospectus,
containing a misrepresentation, in which it invites various persons to
subscribe to a new issue of shares. Other persons read the prospectus
and thereafter purchase some of these shares on the market. The
company must have known that the prospectus would almost certainly
47. 3 T. R. 51, ioO Eng. Rep. R. 450 (789).
48. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) § 529.
49. ANSON, CONTRACTS (17th Eng. ed. 1929) 197.
50. 4 App. Cas. 13 (1878).
5I. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) §531.
52. Id. § 531, comment a.
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get into the hands of third persons and that they would be influenced
by it. Under American law would the company be liable on the sub-
stantial certainty principle?
In English law actual intention must be shown, a defendant not
being held liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation which he has not
intended the plaintiff to act upon. Thus in the leading case of Peek v.
Gurney 53 there must have been a substantial certainty that the fraud-
ulent prospectus would induce persons to buy in the market shares which
had already been issued, but the defendants were held not liable as the
purpose of the prospectus was only to induce persons to apply to the
company for shares. The Restatement's use of the word "intention"
to describe a situation in which actual intention does not as a fact exist
is open to question. 54 Whether or not it is desirable in certain circum-
stances to attribute such a constructive intention to a person is a prac-
tical question which the business man is more competent to answer than
the lawyer. The lawyer can, however, point out that this constructive
intention,-i. e. stating that a person intends a result when in fact he
does not do so-may lead to serious misunderstanding. Thus the
criminal law maxim that "a man must be held to intend the natural
and probable consequences of his acts" is true only in certain limited
circumstances, and may lead to grave injustice if applied without quali-
fication.55 As the problem of liability for deceit is of such great impor-
tance in the modern business world, it is to be regretted that the Restate-
ment has not made it clearer how far this rule of constructive intention
extends when applied to a misrepresentation. One or two additional
illustrations would have been particularly welcome at this point.
Section 536 provides that a person making a fraudulent representa-
tion in a report which a statute requires him either to publish or to
make to a public official who is permitted to hold it open to public
inspection is subject to liability to those for whose information the
report is required. It is not possible to state the English law in such
general terms. Whether a statute which requires such public informa-
tion also gives private rights to individuals can be answered only by
analyzing the particular statute itself. Although it is dangerous to
53. L. R. 6 H. L. 377 (873).
54. Mr. Justice Holmes in The Common Law, 1881 13o, defined intent as
. foresight of the harm as a consequence, coupled with a desire to bring it about,
the latter being conceived as the motive for the act in question". Unless the harm
is desired, there can be no intention even though there is a substantial certainty that it
will be the result of the act.
55. This maxim, although frequently stated in unqualified terms, is only true where
the act itself is wrongful: it cannot be used to make an otherwise legal act illegal.
Thus a legal meeting does not become illegal because some third person will prob-
ably cause disorder, but if the meeting is illegal then those responsible for it will be
held liable for all the probable consequences. In the latter circumstances the law
ascribes a constructive intention to the wrongdoers although they have not in fact
intended to cause any disorder.
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generalize it would seem that the American courts are more ready to
find such private rights than are the English ones,
From the point of view of the "victim", it is provided in Section
538 that reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is justifiable only
if the fact misrepresented is material. As there is no liability in fraud
for a misrepresentation unless the maker has intended the recipient to
act on it, there seems to be little reason for limiting it to material facts.
If the maker of an immaterial misrepresentation hopes thereby to influ-
ence the recipient, why should he not be held liable if he succeeds, even
though no reasonable man would have been affected by his statement
and he did not know that the recipient would be affected by it? Some
of the English cases contain similar references to the materiality of the
misrepresentation, but on analysis this boils down to no more than that
the misrepresentation must have influenced the recipient, Thus in the
leading case of Smith v, Chadwick,56 Jessel, M, R., speaks of "repre-
sentations, which were material to induce him to take the shares", 7 but
materiality here obviously means that the misrepresentation in fact
influenced the plaintiff. The question of materiality is of importance
only in relation to proof, Lindley, L. T., has stated this as follows:
"As regards the materiality and the deception, the case stands-not
only this case but every case-in this way. A false statement made
may be obviously material, and if so the natural inference would be
that the plaintiff relied upon it, and was misled by it, If the statement
is not obviously material a plaintiff may ask the Court, or a jury, if he
goes before a jury, to infer the materiality from the fact that he under-
stood the representation in such and such a way, and acted in such and
such a way, and was prejudiced"." 8 In other words, some statements
are so obviously material that the Court will infer that the plaintiff
relied on them, while in the case of others it is necessary for the plaintiff
to prove that he did so rely on them. The most trivial statement may
therefore be said to be material if the plaintiff has relied on it, Such a
misuse of the word material can only lead to confusion, and it would
therefore be better if it were eliminated from the statement of the law.
A similar point arises in Section 546 which provides that the
maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is liable only if the misrepre-
sentation is "a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct
56. 20 Ch. D. 27 (1882).
57. Id. at 44. If a statement is trivial the court may assume that it could not
have affected the plaintiff's mind. Thus Jessel, M. R. said: "Finally, it is not every
mis-statement, although untrue, and although untrue, in a sense, to the Defendant's
knowledge, that will do. It may be that the mis-statement is trivial-so trivial as
that the Court will be of opinion that it could not have affected the plaintiff's mind
at all, or induced him to enter into the contract . . . ". This does not mean, of
course, that if the trivial statement is shown to have affected the plaintiff's mind there
is no liability. Id. at 45.
58. Id. at 75, 76.
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which results in his [the recipient's] loss". What is meant by "a
substantial factor"? If the fraudulent misrepresentation has in any
way influenced the recipient it is difficult to see why the maker should
not be held liable. It is comparatively easy to judge whether or not a
statement has affected the recipient's action, but it must be much harder
to establish the degree of its effectiveness. For example, was the last
straw which was placed on the camel's back a substantial factor in
causing that unfortunate accident? The English law on this point
seems simpler. It was stated as- follows by Fry, L. J.: "If the false
statement of fact actually influenced the plaintiff, the defendants are
liable, even though the plaintiff may have been also influenced by other
motives". 59 This test of "actual influence" would seem to be a more
satisfactory one than that of "substantial factor".60
The Restatement also seems to be unnecessarily lenient to the fraud-
ulent maker when it provides that "the recipient in a business trans-
action of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying upon
its truth if its falsity is obvious". 61 The English law does not protect
the maker in this way, for, as Baggally, L. J., emphasized: "The person
who has made the misrepresentation cannot be heard to say to the
party to whom he has made that representation, 'You chose to believe
me when you might have doubted me, and gone further' ,,.62 However
foolish or negligent the plaintiff may have been in relying on the
defendant's statement, it is not for the latter to raise such a point. The
Restatement illustrates its rule by the following example: "Thus, if one
induces another to buy a horse by representing it to be sound, the pur-
chaser cannot recover even though the horse has but one eye if the
horse is shown to the purchaser before he buys it and the slightest
inspection would have disclosed the defect".6 3 It would be interesting
to have the citation of the case on which this illustration was based.
In English law the plaintiff would undoubtedly have been held entitled
to recover in these circumstances.
In Sections 542 and 543, the Institute draws a distinction between
the opinion of an antagonistic party and that of an apparently disin-
terested person. There does not seem to be any English case in which
a similar distinction is made. If an antagonistic party fraudulently
states as a fact an opinion which he does not hold there seems to be no
reason why he should not be held liable if he succeeds in misleading the
recipient. The American law seems to assume that it is only the word
59. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 485 (1885).
6o. If the misrepresentation has in no way affected the recipient's conduct then
it is clear that no action will lie. Horsfall v. Thomas, i H. 7 C. 90, 158 Eng. Rep. R.
813 (Ex. 1862).
61. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §541.
62. Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. 1, 23 (i88I).
63. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §541, comment a.
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of the apparently disinterested person which can be relied on. So
gloomy a view of human nature seems hardly to be justified. Of course
the English law holds, as does the American, that mere "puffing" is not
the expression of an opinion.
In Section 551, which deals with liability for non-disclosure, the
Restatement includes two situations which an English text-book would
deal with entirely separately. The first is the duty to disclose informa-
tion when there is a fiduciary or trust relationship. This is not a
case of misrepresentation but of non-representation, and is based on
entirely different principles. It is essential to distinguish the two be-
cause in the case of misrepresentation there must be actual fraud while
in non-representation the liability may be grounded on negligence. Thus
in Nocton v. Ashburton 64 the defendant, who was found not to have
acted fraudulently, was nevertheless held liable because he had failed to
disclose necessary information.6" The second part of this section deals
with the fundamentally different situation in which a person who has
made a representation which he believed to be true when he made it
subsequently discovers that it is untrue. This is not a question of non-
representation but of misrepresentation because the original representa-
tion has now become false. The maker's duty to disclose his error is
clear, but it has nothing to do with any fiduciary relationship; it is based
on the ground that his representation is a continuing one until the
recipient has acted on it, and therefore he must correct it if he finds out
that it is wrong.
G
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
The Restatement classifies negligent misrepresentations under the
heading of deceit. There seems to be little justification for this as the
distinction between fraud and negligence is a clear one. For English
law the line has been drawn once for all by the House of Lords in
Derry v. Peek 67 when it held that negligent misrepresentation cannot
be deceit. This case finally killed the idea that there was such a concept
as constructive fraud, a dangerous and misleading hybrid which equity
was threatening to develop.
Apart from this question of classification, however, American law
seems to be more reasonable on the subject of negligent misrepresenta-
tion than is the present English one. For some reason which is not
clear the English Courts have distinguished between negligent state-
ments and other kinds of negligent conduct. Thus in the leading case
64. Nocton v. Ashburton [1914] A. C. 932.
65. On the question of equitable fraud see Dr. E. C. S. Wade in Cambridge Legal
Essays (1926), 295-314.
66. Incledon v. Watson, 2 F. & F. 841, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 1312 (Ex. 1862).
67. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
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of Le Lievre v. Gould,"8 the Court of Appeal held that there is no
liability for negligent misrepresentations unless the maker of the rep-
resentation is under a contractual duty of care to the recipient. The
most recent case on this subject is Old Gate Estates Ltd. v. Toplis &
Harding & Russell 69 in which the defendants, a firm of valuers who
were employed by the promoters to value certain property which was
to be acquired by the plaintiff company, negligently inisrepresented its
value. It was held that as the defendants owed no contractual duty of
care to the plaintiff company they could not be held liable. Apparently
under Section 552 of the Restatement, the valuers would have been
liable in American law. Professor Winfield in discussing the present
English rules says that "the law is in a regrettable state". 70 He ex-
presses the hope that the House of Lords, which has never directly
considered this question, may extend the doctrine of Donoghue v.
Stevenson 71 to negligent statements, but, as he himself says, one would
hesitate to say that it is probable that they will do so. As it is equally
unlikely that the Law Revision Committee will recommend legislation
on so difficult a subject, it will be necessary to wait until some glaring
case of injustice strengthens the desire for reform in a branch of the
law which most text-book writers regard with regret.
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN NON-BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS
Chapter 23 of the Restatement which deals with misrepresentations
in non-business transactions is an astonishing one. This line which is
drawn between business transactions and others does not exist in Eng-
lish law, and, if it were not for the authority of the American Law
Institute, we would say that it does not exist in American law either.
Apart from all other questions, how are we to draw the line between
business transactions and others? If the law distinguishes between the
two, then the Restatement should have given us some test by which we
could separate them. As it is, Chapter 23 deals with only five special
fact situations. Does this mean that all other non-business fraudulent
misrepresentations fall outside the law? This chapter illustrates the
danger of the idea, which is believed to have some popularity in
American law schools today, that the law of torts is not based on gen-
eral principles but is a series of special rules which vary from situation
to situation.
The five instances chosen by the Institute are peculiar ones. The
first 72 deals with gifts which are fraudulently induced, but nothing is
68. [1893] I Q. B. 491.
69. 3 All E. R. 209, 161 L. T. 227 (K. B. 1939).
70. Op. cit. supra note 2 at 414.
71. [1932] A. C. 562.
72. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §553.
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said of the more common fraud concerning loans. In English law both
of these would come under the ordinary law of deceit. The second "
covers non-disclosure of physical conditions making marital relations
dangerous. This may be a tort, but it is difficult to see why it should
be classified under the heading of deceit as no misrepresentation has
been made. The Restatement, which in other instances takes a strong
line against legal fictions and inaccurate legal words such as malice, etc.,
seems to show a peculiar enthusiasm for constructive fraud. It is an
odd use of the English language to say that a husband who has infected
his wife with venereal disease is liable for non-business deceit. But,
however named, this is not a tort in English law as husbands and wives
cannot sue each other in tort for physical injuries. The third instance 74
covers misrepresentation inducing a woman to live in meretricious rela-
tions. It is not clear what is meant by the phrase "induces a woman to
live with him as his wife". If this means that she lives with him
because of his promise to marry her thereafter, then this would not be
a tort in English law on the general principle that ex turpi causa non
oritur actio. In such circumstances she could recover, if at all, only for
breach of promise of marriage. If the phrase means that the woman
has fraudulently been induced to take part in an invalid ceremony of
marriage then she can recover on the ordinary principles of deceit as
she has relied to her harm on the man's false statement. The fourth
instance 75 deals with a "fraudulent misrepresentation of a third per-
son's fitness for or freedom to marry". 76 There seems to be no English
case in which this very peculiar situation has arisen, but it would clearly
come under the ordinary rules of deceit. The same may be said of the
fifth instance 77 covering fraudulent misrepresentations inducing tor-
tious acts. There would obviously be the same liability if the misrepre-
sentation induced a criminal act, but the Restatement does not mention
this. Nor is it clear why this particular instance has been classified
under non-business deceit: the only English cases on this point which
we can think of arose in connection with business transactions. This
seems to confirm our view that there is no valid distinction between
business and non-business deceit, and that the five peculiar instances of
non-business deceit given in the Restatement do not cover this field of
tortious liability. Would it not have been simpler and more accurate
to state that the tort of deceit consists in the act of making a wilfully
false statement with the intent that the plaintiff shall act in reliance on
73. Id. at § 554.
74. Id. at § 555.
75. Id. at § 556.
76. The grammar of this sentence may be questioned. Throughout the Restate-
inent the Institute has placed more emphasis on accuracy than it has on elegance.
77. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) § 557.
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it, and with the result that he does so act and suffers harm in conse-
quence? 78 This is the general principle on which the law is based, and
the five non-business instances given in the Restatement, in so far as
they relate to deceit at all, seem to be merely illustrations of how it is
applied in practice.
DEFAMATION
The similarity between English and American law is nowhere more
strikingly illustrated than in the law of defamation, for, except in a
limited number of minor details, they seem to follow identical lines.
The distinction between libel and slander, the rules concerning slander
per se and ordinary slander, the various types of privilege-all these
have remained unchanged during the past one hundred and fifty years.
Even in the few instances where there seems to be a difference, there is
considerable doubt as to what the law really is either in England or in
America.
The Restatement's definition of a defamatory communication as
one which "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him" 719 is similar to Lord Atkin's statement
in Sie v. Stretch :80 "Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in
the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?" Lord
Atkin's definition seems to be the more accurate one, as it is necessary
for the Restatement to point out in a comment that only "a substantial
and respectable minority" 81 of the community is meant. Even this is
doubtful, for the right-thinking members of a particular community
may be exceedingly limited. Would an accusation of paederasty not
have been defamatory in Sodom? This may be a question of practical
importance at a time like the present when, owing to mass hysteria, the
great majority of a community may temporarily accept standards which
a small minority justifiably rejects.
8 2
Section 561 is concerned with the defamation of a corporation.
In a caveat to this section it is said that "the Institute expresses no
opinion as to how far a municipal corporation may be defamed or the
circumstances under which it may maintain an action for defamation".
On this point the English law seems to be that a non-trading corpora-
78. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51, IOO Eng. Rep. R. 450 (K. B. 1789).
79. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 559.
80. 2 All E. R. 1237, I24O, 52 T. L. R. 669 (H. L. 1936).
8I. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 559, comment e.
82. The Institute does no make it clear how large a group must be to be de-
scribed as a community. In Illustration (2) to Section 559, in which reference is made
to the Ku Klux Klan, would a small town be a community? Every man in this town
might approve of lynching although the people of the State as a whole disapproved
of it. Under these circumstances would an allegation that a resident of the town
belonged to the Klan be defamatory or not?
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tion, such as a municipal body, may sue for a libel tending to its pecu-
niary damage.A3 On the other hand, where there is no actual damage
nor any tendency to produce such damage, no action will lie at the suit
of the corporation. Thus in Mayor of Manchester v. Williams 84 it
was held that a municipal corporation could not recover damages for a
libel charging it with corruption and bribery.
Section 562 is a startling one for an English lawyer to read, not
because it introduces a novel rule in the law of defamation, but because
it seems to create a new type of legal person. It provides that a part-
nership as such may be defamed, and that both the partnership and the
individual partners may have separate causes of action for the defama-
tory communication. Under English law an action may in certain cir-
cumstances be brought in the name of the partnership, but this does
not turn the partnership into a legal person. Therefore such an action,
even if brought in the name of the partnership, still remains that of the
individual partners who are the only persons recognized by the law.
The American law as given in the Restatement suggests that the part-
nership is here treated as a legal person distinct from the partners who
compose it. May not this novel rule give rise to the danger of a double
recovery by the same persons, first as individuals and then as a part-
nership?
In comment d to Section 563, which deals with the meaning of the
communication, it is pointed out that the public frequently reads only
the headlines of a newspaper, and therefore the text of the article is
ordinarily not the context of the headline, although it may explain the
defamatory imputation conveyed in the headline. The English Court
of Appeal has recently expressed the same view in English and Scottish
Co-operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society, Ltd. v.
Oldhamns Press, Ltd., 5 a case rendered all the more striking by the fact
that the headline was held to have been libellous although its terms were
technically true."8
Illustration (i) to Section 566 is rather a strange one. It holds
that to state of a political opponent who has blocked reform measures
that he "is no better than a murderer" is defamatory. It is probable
that the English courts would hold that this was merely a form of
abuse, and therefore not actionable. American political controversies
83. SALmOND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 401, 402.
84. [1891] 1 Q. B. 94.
85. [1940] 1 K. B. 44o.
86. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 564, Illustration (4), and § 565 Illustration
(1), are based on the English cases of Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 5o T.
L. R. 581 (C. A. 1934) and Tolley v. Fry, [1930] 1 K. B. 467. The number of recent
English cases used as illustrations throughout the Restatements show how closely the
two legal systems resemble each other at the present time.
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must be conducted on a very high level if such a remark is held to fall
within the law of defamation.
In Section 568 libel and slander are distinguished. Here again the
Institute was faced with the same problem which is met with in English
law, for the line between libel and slander is not based on satisfactory
grounds, and is therefore a difficult one to draw in practice. Whether
the Institute's attempt to rationalize the distinction will not add to the
complications is an arguable point. As far as English law is concerned
it may be said that libel consists in a defamatory statement made in
permanent form while slander is a statement made orally or by gestures.
The difference is based entirely on form, and the only questions which
arise are concerned with this. Thus, for example, the popular moot
problem whether sky-writing can be the basis of an action for libel
depends on whether such writing can be said to be sufficiently permanent
or not. The Institute, after stating that libel consists of the publication
of defamatory matter in written words or in physical form while
slander consists of spoken words or transitory gestures, adds that "the
area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its
publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct are factors
to be considered in determining whether a publication is a libel rather
than a slander". This is a most important addition to, or rather alter-
ation in the law, for in the place of form as the sole test it now bases
the distinction on the effect of the defamation, and on the purpose and
character of the speaker's act. It is obvious that under these latter tests
most defamatory statements made on the wireless will be classed as libel
as the area of dissemination is so wide.8 7 The effect of this provision
can also be seen in the illustration 88 which holds that the persistent
"shadowing" of a person by detectives constitutes a libel. There is no
English case which reaches this startling conclusion.
On a small point relating to slander per se the American law seems
preferable to the English. The Restatement provides 89 that it is slan-
der per se to publish imputations affecting the conduct of a person's
public office whether honorary or for profit. The English rule seems
to be that when the plaintiff's office is one of honor only, such as that
of a Justice of the Peace, words spoken of him in that regard are not
actionable per se, unless, if true, they would be a ground of depriva-
tion.90
87. The question whether it is libel or slander if a speaker reads from a written
manuscript has not been answered in English law. See SALMOND, Op. Cit. supra note
2 at 396.
88. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 568, illustration (i).
89. Id. at § 573.
go. Alexander v. Jenkins, [1892] I Q. B. 797.
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On another but much more important point the American law
again seems preferable to the English. It holds 91 that if the slander is
repeated by the person to whom it has been published, the originator
is liable for the harm so caused although he did not intend the repetition,
provided that he had reason to expect that it would be so repeated.
"In determining this", says the Restatement, "the known tendency of
human beings to repeat discreditable statements about their neighbors
is a factor to be considered." 92 This is common sense, but the English
courts, following the doubtful precedent of Ward v. Weeks,93 have
reached a different conclusion. In that case the Court of Common
Pleas held that the defendant could not be held liable for the repetition,
Tindal, C. J., saying: "Every man must be taken to be answerable for
the necessary consequences of his own wrongful acts: but such a spon-
taneous and unauthorized communication cannot be considered as the
necessary consequence of the original uttering of the words".9 4 Al-
though this reasoning is obviously open to criticism, the authority of
Ward v. Weeks was accepted by the majority of the House of Lords in
Weld-Bhdell v. Stephens 95 where Lord Sumner made the remarkable
statement that "even though A is in fault, he is not responsible for
injury to C, which B, a stranger to him, deliberately chooses to do.
Though A may have given th6 occasion for B's mischievous activity,
B then becomes a new and independent cause." He applied this rule
to the repetition of a defamatory statement even though "few things
are more certain than the repetition of a calumny confidentially com-
municated, even on an honourable understanding of secrecy". As the
House of Lords is absolutely bound by its own judgments, this unfor-
tunate doctrine will remain a permanent part of English law unless Par-
liament can be induced to alter it.
A doubtful point is discussed in Section 577. The Institute takes
the position that the dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer
is a libel even though the notes are never transcribed. Although there
is no English case which directly covers this question, it seems to be
generally accepted that such dictation can be only slander. As has been
succinctly said: "It is difficult to see how A can publish to B a docu-
ment which is written by B himself". 96 Of course, if the dictated letter
is later published to a third person, then the principal is liable in libel
for this publication.
97
91. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 576.
92. Id., comment a.
93. 7 Bing. 21, 131 Eng. Rep. R. 81 (C. P. i83o).
94. Id. at 215.
95. [1920] A. C. 956, 986.
96. SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 413.
97. Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son [I93O] 2 K. B. 226. 231. 217.
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Section 579 deals with the interesting question of whether A who
has published a defamatory statement which is true of B can be held
liable to C who has the same or a similar name. The Restatement states
that the publisher's mistaken belief, however reasonable, that the name
is applicable only to a third person intended by him, does not constitute
a defence, as the question is not "who is meant but who is hit". This
point has recently been considered by the English Court of Appeal in
Newstead v. Lomion Express Newspaper 98 where the same conclusion
was reached.
Section 581 provides that one who disseminates (e. g. a library)
defamatory matter originally published by a third person is liable
"unless he has no reason to know of its defamatory character". The
same principle is applied in the English cases; in these the chief problem
has related to the question whether the disseminator had been negligent
in failing to examine the publication which he ought to have known
might contain a libel. 99 It is interesting to note that both the American
and the English rules are exceptions to the general principle on which
the law of defamation is based, for in no other case is liability based on
negligence. The specially favorable position now occupied by dissem-
inators has been created by judicial legislation, and is based on the
view that under modern conditions of publication it would be unreason-
able to hold them strictly liable in all circumstances. It is not improb-
able that in the near future a similar protection will be extended to
printers who, at the present time, are frequently held liable for publish-
ing defamatory statements against which they could not possibly have
guarded.
As a general rule in both American and English law truth is an
absolute defense in a civil action for libel. 10 0 The Restatement points
out, however, that in certain States truth is not a defense if the publica-
tion is made from malicious motives or not for justifiable ends. 10 1
There is much to be said for such a limitation on the present license of
the press; a study of the practical effect of these statutes ought there-
fore to be of value. Shortly before the present war began the Lord
Chancellor appointed a committee to consider possible alterations in
the law of libel, but it has been found necessary to adjourn its meetings
until after the conclusion of the war. When it meets again it might
consider the desirability of enacting legislation along these lines.
98. [1939] 2 K. B. 317.
99. Vizetelley v. Mudie's Select Library Ltd., [igoo] 2 Q. B. 170; Bottomley v.
Voolworth & Co., 48 T. L. R. 521 (C. A. 1932) ; Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada
v. Wi. H. Smith & Son, Ltd., 15o L. T. 211 (C. A. 1934).
IO. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §582.
iOI. Id., comment a, special note.
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In the chapter covering defences to actions for defamation the
section 102 dealing with the privilege of attorneys at law is of particular
interest for English readers. It states that attorneys are absolutely
privileged in communications made preliminary to or during the course
of a judicial proceeding; it says nothing, however, about communica-
tions between an attorney and his client which are not made in relation
to litigation, nor does it say anything about the client's own privilege.
In English law the privilege is regarded as one which is shared equally
by the solicitor and the client. 10 3  Nor is it confined to litigation;
rather it extends to any business which is professional within the
ordinary scope of a solicitor's employment. The only doubtful ques-
tion is whether the privilege is absolute or qualified: on this point the
House of Lords expressly reserved its opinion in Minter v. Priest.104
This privilege must be distinguished from the entirely different evi-
dentiary privilege which covers the non-disclosure of such communi-
cations. The latter is the privilege of the client alone and not of the
solicitor.
Section 591 provides that the defamatory statements made by the
President and cabinet officers of the United States and by the Governors
and the corresponding State officers are absolutely privileged. A similar
but less definite rule exists in English law. In Chatterton v. Secretary
of State for India 105 Lord Esher said: "It is not competent to a civil
court to entertain a suit in respect of the action of an official of State
in making such a communication to another official in the course of
his official duty, or to inquire whether or not he acted maliciously in
making it". This rule is less certain than is the American one, as it is
not clear who are officials of State within its meaning, but on the
other hand, it seems to be a more reasonable one as the line drawn
by the Restatement between a Cabinet officer and other officials is a
more or less arbitrary one, especially at the present time when the heads
of various boards and departments are of comparable importance.
A particularly useful analysis of conditional privilege is contained
in Section 594. This is stated to exist when there is a reasonable belief
that (a) a sufficiently important interest of the publisher's is affected,
and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the matter will be of service in
protecting the interest. Nothing is said here of any duty or interest
on the part of the recipient: the statement is privileged provided it is
reasonably in the publisher's interest to make it. This is similar to
102. Id. at § 586.
IO3. More v. Weaver, [1928] 2 K. B. 520.
104. [I93O] A. C. 558.
1o5. [1895] 2 Q. B. i89, IgI.
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Parke, B.'s frequently quoted statement in Toogood v. Spyring10 8 that
a publication is privileged if it is fairly made by a person "in the con-
duct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned".
However, in Harrison v. Bush l 0 7 Lord Campbell stated the rule to be
that "a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which
he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty". In that case the defendant had addressed a defama-
tory petition to the Home Secretary, and it was clear that if the Home
Secretary had no duty in relation to it, the defendant could have had
no interest in sending it to him. Unfortunately, Lord Campbell's
statement was repeated by Lord Atkinson in Adam v. Ward 10 8 as if it
were applicable to every case of privilege. It is misleading, however,
because the recipient need not have a corresponding interest or duty,
provided that the statement is reasonably made by the publisher in his
own interest. Thus, if A, in the presence of B, reasonably and in his
own interest accuses C of having committed a crime, the occasion is
privileged, even though B has no interest or duty in hearing the accusa-
tion, provided only that A could not reasonably have waited until B
was gone. To say that B has an interest or duty in such circumstances
is an obvious misuse of ordinary language, while to hold that the state-
ment is not privileged because B overheard it is both contrary to reason
and authority. 0 9 Of course, if a statement is unnecessarily made to
a third person who has no concern with it, then it is not privileged as it
cannot be in the interest of the publisher to make it in such a case." 0
The test here is still the publisher's interest and not the recipient's
duty."'
An interesting point on conditional privilege arises in connection
with the reports made by a mercantile rating agency. The Restatement
provides 112 that such a report is privileged, but the English law on this
point is doubtful. The House of Lords has held :" that the reports of
a trade protection association made to its own members are privileged,
but in an earlier case "4 the Privy Council held that the reports of a
company organized for commercial profit were not so privileged.
lo6. I Cr. M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. R. Io44 (Ex. 1834).
107. 5 El. & Bl. 344, 348, 119 Eng. Rep. R. 509 (K. B. 1856).
lo8. [1917] A. C. 309, 334.
Iog. On this point see Note (1940) 56 L. Q. R. 262-266.
iIo. Blagg v. Sturt, so Q. B. 899, 116 Eng. Rep. R. 340 (1846).
iii. It is important to note that in the Restatement it is said that "reasonable
belief" that the recipient's knowledge will be of service is enough. In English law
a communication made to the wrong person, however reasonable the mistake may
be, forfeits the privilege, Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. D. 215 (1877).
112. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (938) §595, comment g.
113. London Association for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd. [1916] 2 A.
C. 15.
I14. Macintosh v. Dun, [19o8] A. C. 390.
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Although this case is still cited in the books it is generally held no
longer to be of authority. 115
An important difference between English and American law is
marked by Section 6oi. This section states that a conditional privilege
is lost if the maker of the statement, although believing the defamatory
matter to be true, has no reasonable grounds for so believing. English
law, on the other hand, "requires that a privilege shall be used honestly,
but not that it shall be used carefully". 1 " The privilege is therefore
not lost even though the defendant has been negligent in making the
statement.117 The fact that the defendant had no reasonable grounds
for his alleged belief is, however, evidence that the statement was made
maliciously.""
Under the title of "Privileged Criticism" the Restatement deals
with the defence which in English law is described as "Fair Comment".
The American term is the happier of the two as comment to be so
protected need not be fair in the ordinary sense of the word. It covers
criticism which is exaggerated and prejudicial provided only that it is
honestly made. On the other hand, to speak of this general right to
criticize as "privileged criticism" may obscure the fact that this defence
is not in the same category as the various absolute and qualified privi-
leges which are based on the special position or interest of the person
who has made the defamatory statement. This distinction was clearly
drawn by the judges in Campbell v. Spottiswoode,"19 Crompton, J.
saying: "The first question is, whether the article on which this action
is brought is a libel or no libel-not whether it is privileged or not. It
is no libel if it is within the range of fair comment, that is, if a person
might fairly and bona fide write the article; otherwise it is". The
importance of the distinction as Blackburn, J.1
20 emphasized, is that in
the case of a qualified privilege no action lies unless there is proof of
express malice, while in the case of criticism which is beyond the range
of fair comment the absence of malice is no defence. This point,
which occupies considerable space in the English text-books, might
profitably have been mentioned in the comment to this section as it is
of more than theoretical interest.
Both American 121 and English law 122 agree that criticism made
solely for the purpose of causing harm to another is not privileged
115. SALMOND, op. cit. mupra note 2 at 433, n. (d).
II6. Id. at 426.
i17. Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237 (877).
118. Royal Aquarium Society v. Parkinson, [I892] i Q. B. 43i, 455.
is9 3 B. & S. 769, 778, 122 Eng. Rep. R. 288 (K. B. 1863).
120. Id. at 780.
121. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938) § 6o6.
122. Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co. Ltd., [igo6] 2 K. B. 627; Sutherland
v. Stopes, [1925] A. C. 47.
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even though, if it had been made without malice, it would have come
within the defence of fair comment. This view was criticized by Sir
John Salmond 123 who said that "if there are two criticisms of a book
by different writers, both couched in similar terms, and each being on
its face fair comment, it seems difficult to say that one exceeds the limit
of fair comment, because the writer of it is actuated by malice against
the author, whereas the other does not exceed those limits because the
writer is not so actuated". This apparent antinomy is due to the mis-
leading phrase "fair comment". The answer becomes clear when we
realize that the defence of fair comment is necessary only when the
comment is not fair in the sense of being true. As truth is always
a defence, the defence of fair comment need be raised only where the
critic has made a statement which, but for this defence, would be held
to be defamatory. The Restatement by speaking of "privileged criti-
cism" instead of "fair comment" avoids this apparent difficulty. It is
therefore reasonable to hold that a person who has been actuated by
malice should not be entitled to raise this defence. A close analogy
to this may be found in the law of nuisance where an act done ma-
liciously may constitute a nuisance although the same act, if done bona
fide, would not be one. 12 4 The Restatement emphasizes the point that
the defence of privileged criticism is not affected because the critic
dislikes the person whose act he is criticising: it is lost only if the
publication is made solely from spite or ill-will. Such single-minded
spite must be comparatively rare. In English law an evil motive will
probably destgoy the privilege in spite of the fact that the critic may
also have other justifiable motives for the publication.
The second part of Section 6o6 deals with criticism of the private
conduct or character of another in so far as it affects his public con-
duct. This is privileged if it is such as a man of reasonable judgment
might make. There is no such provision in English law, as it has been
held that an attack on the private character of a person does not fall
within the bounds of fair comment. 25 Thus to state that a novel
shows the novelist to be a person of sexually perverted instincts would
not be privileged even though the comment might be one with which a
reasonable man might agree. According to the Restatement this would
be privileged in American law.
1 26
Section 61I deals with the reports of judicial, legislative and ex-
ecutive proceedings. These are privileged if they are (a) accurate,
123. SALMOND, op. cit. suprd. note 2 at 446, 447.
124. Christie v. Davey, [1893] I Ch. 316; Hollywood Silver Fox Farm, Ltd. v.
Emmett, [1936] 2 K. B. 468.
125. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, 777; 122 Eng. Rep. R. 288 (K. B.
1863); Carr v. Hood, i Camp. 354 n. (N. P. i8o8).
126. RESTATFmENT, TORTS (1938) § 6og.
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and (b) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person
defamed. Is there any actual American case where a defendant has
been held liable under (b) ? The difficulty of proof here would seem
to be almost insuperable. In English law the reports of judicial pro-
ceedings are covered by the Law of Libel Amendment Act, i888; 12T7
and although it is not certain whether the privilege is an absolute one,
it is generally assumed that it is. The Parliamentary Papers Act,
184o,128 confers an absolute privilege on the reports of the proceedings
of Parliament and on the publication of all papers by order of either
House. There is no statutory provision covering other legislative and
executive proceedings; these are, therefore, protected only by the quali-
fied privilege given to publications made in the public interest.
On the question concerning the respective functions of the judge
and the jury in defamation cases American .2 9 and English law 130 are
identical. This is of particular interest, as Fox's Libel Act 131 which
settled the controversy for English law was not enacted until 1792.
Its claim to be a declaratory Act, made necessary because of the un-
warranted usurpation by the Judges, has ihus been strengthened, as
the American courts administer the common law and not the English
statutes enacted after the Revolution.
The rules concerning the measure of damages for defamation are
the same in both systems except on one point where the English law is
doubtful. Section 623 of the Restatement provides that emotional
distress and the resulting bodily harm may be elements in the recovery
of damages. English text-books, citing AIlsop v. Allsop,132 take the
view that illness resulting from mental trouble caused by the defamatory
statement is too remote. It is possible, however, that the Courts might
take a different view of the law if the question were presented to them
today, as the Court of Appeal has recently taken an advanced line on
the subject of nervous shock.
133
DISPARAGEMENT
Division Six deals with the disparagement which in English law
is usually described as slander of title or slander of goods. The Amer-
ican term has the advantage of brevity, but on the other hand, it has
the disadvantage of including two separate ideas under a single word,
127. 51 & 52 Vicr., c. 64 (1888).
328. 3 & 4 Vicr., c. 9 (1840).
129. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 614.
130. WINFIELD, op. cit. supra note 2 at 272, 273.
331. 32 GEo. III, c. 6o (3792).
132. 5 H. & N. 534, i57 Eng. Rep. R. 1292 (Ex. i86o).
133. Owens v. Liverpool Corporation, [i939] I K. B. 394.
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for slander of title and slander of the quality of goods 134 are not the
same thing. To say that A has disparaged B's property in certain
chattels by asserting an adverse claim to them is not a particularly
happy phrase.
An important question of principle is raised by this Chapter.
English lawyers have recently been speaking of the wrong of "In-
jurious Falsehood" 135 which consists in false statements made to
other persons concerning the plaintiff whereby he suffers loss through
the action of those others. This covers the general principle of which
slander of title and of goods are merely specific instances. This has
the great advantage of simplyfying the law and of avoiding unneces-
sary repetition. The Restatement has chosen the other course of deal-
ing with disparagement as a separate type of liability. Thus, as is
carefully pointed out,' 36 this chapter does not cover the problem raised
where A falsely tells B that C has gone out of business. In the English
text-books this and other similar questions are conveniently included
in the same chapter as slander of title, since these injuries are governed
by exactly the same principles.
The American rule as stated in Section 624 seems to be substan-
tially similar to the English one except for one major and one minor
distinction. The first is that in English law no liability for disparage-
ment can be grounded on a false statement which is made carelessly
but not intentionally.137  The Restatement does not specifically state
that in American law there is liability for such a negligent false state-
ment, but the wording of this section is sufficiently wide to include
it.138 There is much to be said for the American rule: in the case of
hn ordinary libel or slander liability exists apart from intention, so
why should the rule not be equally strict in the case of disparagement
where equal or greater harm may be done by a false statement? The
second difference is that the American rule is limited to purchasers or
lessees and does not apply to cases where the disparaging statement
has caused a security transaction not to be consummated. This dis-
tinction does not seem to have been made in any of the English books.
Section 627 covers disparaging statements of opinion, and makes
the publisher liable if he does not hold the opinion which he expresses.
There does not seem to be any English case in which this point has
134. In the leading case of White v. Millen, [1895] A. C. 154 the House of Lords
frequently used the expression "disparaging a trader's goods" as synonymous with
slander of goods, but not to include slander of title.
135. SALMOND, op. cit. suPra note 2 at c. 19.
136. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §324.
137. Balden v. Shorter, [1933] 1 Ch. 427.
138. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 626, where it is said "circumstances which
would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person . . . would
be determined thereby", also seems to be based on negligence.
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been considered. The caveat to this section raises the question whether
one who gives an expert opinion to an intending purchaser is liable to
the prospective vendor if he negligently disparages his property. In
English law there would be no liability for such a negligent disparage-
ment as there is no duty of care.139
Illustration (i) to Section 633 is of particular interest as it pro-
vides that a middleman can recover damages if the quality of the goods
which he handles is disparaged, and if he can prove that as a result of
this his business has fallen off. There does not seem to be any English
case on this point but on principle there is no reason why a tradesman
should not be entitled to recover in these circumstances.
The comment on clause (b) of Section 633, which is concerned
with liability for pecuniary loss, states that the expense of an advertis-
ing campaign, the purpose of which is to convince the public that the
disparaging statements are untrue, cannot be recovered as damages.
A different view seems to have been taken by the English court in
Aerial Advertising Co. Ltd. v. Batchelor's Peas Ltd.140 In this case
the plaintiffs had entered into a contract to send over various towns
aeroplanes trailing behind them streamers advertising the defendants'
peas. Owing to the extraordinary fact that one of their pilots forgot
that November i i was Armistice Day, an aeroplane with this streamer
flew over Manchester during the two minutes' silence. On the de-
fendants' counterclaim the Court held that they were entitled to recover
the expenditure they had incurred in advertising an apology. It is
true that this was a contract case, but there seems to be no reason why
such a recovery should not be allowed in the case of a tort such as
disparagement of property.
In the chapter dealing with the various privileges relating to dis-
paragement the Restatement repeats in eleven sections the rules already
stated in the case of libel and slander. Is such enthusiasm for repeti-
tion necessary? Would it not have been more convenient to state that
the rules concerning privilege in disparagement are the same as in
libel and slander except in the following particulars, and then to give
a list of the exceptions? As it is, it is necessary to read the comment to
each section to ascertain whether any new matter has been included in it.
Moreover, as the order in which the privileges are given has been
altered in the chapter on disparagement it is necessary to check this to
see whether all have been included. In fact a new one has been added,
for in Section 645 the privilege of public officers is stated. No reason
139. There is no English case directly on this point, but it seems to be covered
by the principle of Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] i Q. B. 491.
140. [1938] 2 All E. R. 788, 82 SOL. Jo. 567.
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is given why this privilege is not included in the section on libel and
slander although it seems to be equally applicable to such cases.
Section 650 provides that in certain circumstances a person is
privileged to disparage the quality of another's land or chattels for the
puropse of protecting a third person from harm. In these cases there
must be a reasonable belief that the publication is necessary, and either
a legal or moral duty to give such protection. An illustration states
that such a privilege exists where "A sees B a close friend about to
take passage on a vessel which he reasonably believes to be unsea-
worthy". Does this mean that A would not be privileged if B were
not a close friend? There is no suggestion of such a limitation in the
English cases. 141  Some of the illustrations given in the Restatement
might be made clearer if the reader was certain that all the facts
included in them were part of the ratio decidendi.
UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATION
In the introductory note to this Division the Institute states that
it prefers the term "wrongful prosecution" to "malicious prosecution"
as malice may be used in different senses. This undoubtedly is true,
but there is some advantage in retaining the traditional name for this
tort as all the earlier cases will be indexed under it. Here convenience
may be preferable to strict accuracy, especially as the meaning of
malice can hardly mislead the lawyer who has read the cases on this
subject.
In spite of the fact that American and English criminal procedure
differ in many fundamental regards (e. g. there are no district attorneys
in England) the rules concerning the tort of wrongful prosecution are
substantially the same. Even the same difficulties are found, especially
in determining when a person may be said to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings. Some of the minor differences may be noted here.
The American law covers all criminal proceedings. 142  Under
English law the action can be brought only where the criminal prosecu-
tion may cause damage to a man's fame, person or property. 43 Some
purely technical criminal proceedings therefore lie outside the scope
I41. Casey v. Arnott, 2 C. P. D. 24 (1876).
I42. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 653.
143. In Wiffen v. Bailey and Romford Urban Council [191] I K. B. 6oo, 6o6,
Buckley, L. J. said: "There are three sorts of damage, any one of which is sufficient
to support this action. First, damage to a man's fame, as if the matter whereof he
is accused be scandalous. Secondly, damage to his person, as where a man is put
in danger to lose his life, limb, or liberty. Thirdly, damage to his property, as where
he is forced to expend in necessary charges to acquit himself of the crime of which
he is accused. The action is maintainable if and only if it falls within one or other
of those three heads."
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of this tort, but these are of such slight importance that they can hardly
be said to form an exception to the general rule.
In English law if the prosecution has determined in any manner
in favor of the plaintiff an action will lie.1 44 In American law 145 no
action can be brought if the proceedings have been abandoned (a) pur-
suant to an agreement of compromise, or (b) because the accused has
suppressed evidence for the purpose of preventing his conviction, or
(c) out of mercy requested or accepted by the accused. To an English
lawyer these three exceptions are rather surprising. An agreement of
compromise relating to a criminal prosecution would be held to be
contrary to public policy as it is in the interest of the State that the
criminal law should be properly enforced. Nor can the fact that the
accused has suppressed evidence in any way affect the finality of his
acquittal. Such evidence could however be used later by the defendant
at the trial for malicious prosecution to prove that the proceedings
had been initiated with probable cause. The rule concerning the re-
quest for mercy is particularly open to question. An innocent person
may request the prosecutor to abandon the criminal proceedings: if the
prosecutor shows this "mercy" at a late stage why should the accused
be deprived of any redress for the earlier wrong he has suffered? The
Institute says 146 that "a private prosecutor who initiates a criminal
prosecution should not be penalized for an act of mercy", but this
assumes that the plaintiff was guilty. As it is always open to the
defendant in an action for malicious prosecution to prove that he had
reasonable cause for bringing the prosecution in spite of the fact that
the proceedings were later abandoned, why should the plaintiff be
prohibited from bringing his action merely because the prosecutor has
abandoned the proceedings at his request?
After stating that there must be a reasonable belief in the facts
alleged, Section 662 adds that the defendant must correctly believe
that such facts constitute the offence charged against the accused, or
be acting on the advice of counsel. In English law all that is required
of the prosecutor is that he show the same reasonable care in regard
to the law as he does in regard to the facts.147  If a prosecutor act
bona fide on an opinion given by counsel this is a complete defence.' 48
Section 667 marks an interesting difference between English and
American law. It states that the conviction of the accused by a magis-
trate or trial court conclusively establishes the existence of probable
144. SALMOND, Op. Cit. supra note 2 at 663.
145. RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1938) §66o.
146. Id. at § 66o, comment e.
147. Phillips v. Naylor, 4 H. & N. 565, 157 Eng. Rep. R. 962 (Ex. 1859).
148. Ravenga v. Macintosh, 2 B. 7 C. 693, 1O7 Eng Rep. R. 541 (K. B. 1824).
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cause although it is thereafter reversed by an appellate tribunal, unless
the conviction was obtained by corrupt means. In the recent case of
Herniman v. SmithZ 149 the House of Lords held that the fact that the
plaintiff had been convicted and sentenced did not prevent his bringing
an action for malicious prosecution as his conviction had been set aside
by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Here the English law seems to be
the more reasonable. The prosecutor may have had knowledge of
certain facts, not disclosed at the trial, which showed that he did not
have reasonable cause for bringing the prosecution: why should he be
protected because the trial court on other evidence erroneously con-
victed the plaintiff ?
Section 673 deals with the respective functions of the judge and
the jury. Here again we find a striking resemblance between English
and American law, for both provide that it is for the judge to deter-
mine, on the relevant facts as found by the jury, whether the defendant
had probable cause for initiating the proceedings. On this point it
has been said that "this anomalous rule was established as a precaution
against erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff-per doubt del lay gents.
Reasonable and probable cause was withdrawn from the cognizance
of juries, under the pretense that it was a question of law." 150 It is
interesting that this anomalous rule should still exist in both systems
after one hundred and fifty years.
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
There is considerable difference between the American and the
English law concerning the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.
This is probably due to the fact that such wrongful proceedings are
initiated less frequently in England than they seem to be in America.
There are three primary reasons for this. The first is that the English
rules concerning the costs of litigation make it unpleasantly expensive
to bring an action which does not succeed. Therefore only a very
poor or a very wealthy man can afford to gratify his malice in this
way. Secondly, as there is a strict rule against contingent fees either
for barristers or solicitors there is far less temptation to bring specu-
lative actions in England than there is in America. Thirdly, if a
solicitor represented a client in an obvious blackmailing action he might
find that his name was struck off the Rolls.
Section 674 states as a general principle that one who initiates
civil proceedings is liable if (I) they are initiated without probable
cause, (2) primarily for an indirect purpose and (3) except where
149. [1938] A. C. 305.
150. SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 659, n. (e).
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they are ex parte, have terminated in favor of the person against whom
they are brought. The essential elements are thus the same as in the
case of malicious prosecution. English law, on the other hand, dis-
tinguishes sharply between civil and criminal proceedings. Except for
certain special cases there is no cause of action for malicious civil
proceedings. Bowen, L. J. summed up the position when he said: "The
bringing of an action under our present rules of procedure and under
our present law, even if it is brought without reasonable and probable
cause and with malice, gives rise to no ground of complaint." 151 From
the Lord Justice's emphasis on the point that. this is the present law,
it is not unfair to assume that he was in favor of a change in the law,
a feeling which has been shared by many other judges and counsel.Y5 2
The only civil proceedings for which an action clearly lies in English
law are (i) malicious bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings, (2)
malicious civil arrest, which must be distinguished from false imprison-
ment, and (3) malicious execution against property.
Section 675 deals with the existence of probable cause in the case
of civil proceedings, and points out that this requirement here is less
stringent than it is in the case of criminal prosecutions, because in the
former it is enough that the claimant believes that there is a chance
that his claim may be held valid upon adjudication. The Institute's
rationale on this point begins with the sentences: "It is impossible
that a man may correctly believe that a claim may be valid. lie may
believe that it is valid and that the correctness of that belief will be
established by the court's finding in his favor." 153 As many of the
comments and illustrations throughout the Restatement seem to assume
that it will be consulted by not very intelligent children, this ought to
give them something to bite on. There does not seem to be any English
case in which this question has been discussed.
The Institute points out 154 that the advice of a lawyer who is
personally interested in the outcome of the case because of a contingent
fee arrangement made before the facts are submitted to him, will not
protect the client. This suggests that in the interest of the decent
administration of justice there is much to be said for the English rule
against contingent fees.
As Section 674 has stated the general principles on which this
action is based, it is difficult to see why Section 677 dealing with
151. Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, ii Q. B. D. 674, 689 (1883).
152. SALMOND, op. Cit. supra note 2 at 656, on this point says, "It seems that a
litigant may maliciously and without any reasonable ground make the gravest charges
of fraud or other disgraceful conduct without incurring any other liability than that
of paying the costs of the proceedings."
153. RESTATEMENT, ToRTS (1938) §675, comment f.
154. Id., comment h.
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arrest or deprivation of property, Section 678 dealing with proceedings
alleging insanity or insolvency (an odd combination), or Section 679
dealing with repetition of civil proceedings 155 are set out at length in
the Restatement. Are they not merely particular instances of the
general principle? By stating them separately doubt is cast on the
existence of such a rule in other cases. It is just because there is no
such general rule in English law that it is necessary to set out the few
instances where such an action can be brought.
Of particular interest is Section 68o as it deals with a point which
seems never to have been raised in England. It provides that the
rules concerning wrongful civil proceedings are applicable also to pro-
ceedings before an administrative board. In view of the rapidly
growing number of such tribunals it is obvious that such a rule is
desirable to protect persons who might otherwise have no redress
against a clear wrong.
ABUSE OF PROCESS
The Chapter dealing with abuse of process is an astonishing one
from the standpoint of an English lawyer. It provides that one who
uses a legal process against another to accomplish a purpose for which
it is not designed is liable to the other even if the proceedings have
terminated in favor of the person instituting them. This seems to
carry the doctrine of the abuse of rights 156 very far indeed. Illustra-
tion (3) is a remarkable one.157 In this case C's valid claim against B
is assigned to D, who resides some distance from B, so that B may be
induced to pay the claim rather than to undergo the inconvenience of
appearance. B not appearing, a bench warrant is issued for his arrest
under which he is fined and execution against his body is ordered.
A, the attorney who has engineered this scheme, is held liable to B for
abuse of process. It would be interesting to know whether there are
many cases on this point and in how many the plaintiff has succeeded.
The bringing of an action on a debt which has been assigned must
under American law always be open to risk on the part of the attorney
as the debtor can allege that there has been an abuse of process if he
155. English law protects persons against the unjustifiable repetition of civil pro-
ceedings by giving the High Court power to prohibit, under certain circumstances,
the institution of actions without leave (Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolida-
tion) Act, 1925, 15 & I6 GEo. V, c. 49, § 5i). This Act does not, however, give the
victim of such actions a right to damages.
i56. See Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights (933) 5 CAMB. L. J. 22.
157. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938) § 682, Illustration (3). Illustration (I) is
equally interesting, but there is not space to consider it here. Apparently this case
so surprised the printer that he confused the initials of the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. This, however, does not make the result look any odder than it would
have been if the initials had been placed in the correct order.
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has been put to any inconvenience. Fortunately for the solicitors there
is no such rule in England, the cases being limited to instances where
the defendants knew that they were not entitled to the process which
they had instituted maliciously and without reasonable cause.
INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
On the whole the American and English rules dealing with inter-
ference with domestic relations are based on the same principles,
although there are some differences in detail. Strange to say, the
American law, which is popularly supposed to favor women unduly,
does not give the American wife greater rights than are possessed by
her English sister, and in one instance 158 they may even be less.
Section 683 provides that one who purposely alienates a wife's
affections from her husband commits a tort. Mere alienation of affec-
tions is sufficient even though it is not accompanied by separation or
adultery. Fortunately there is no such tort in English law as it is
obvious that this must be a fruitful field for blackmail. It is inter-
esting to note that comment (a) points out that statutes in several
states forbid the bringing of such an action.
In Section 684 it is stated that one who, without a privilege to do
so and for the purpose of disrupting the marriage relation, induces a
wife to separate from her husband commits a tort. Although this tort
was well-established in the eighteenth century, there was some doubt
whether it had survived in England, but in the recent case of Place v.
Searle -19 the Court of Appeal held that it did.
Criminal conversation with a married woman is, under Section
685, a tort. This action was abolished in England by the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1857,160 which has substituted for it a petition in the
Divorce Court, either with or without a petition for divorce. In prac-
tice petitions which are concerned only with damages are exceedingly
rare and do not seem to be regarded with favor by the judges.
Section 686 deals with the privilege of a parent or other person
to alienate the affections of a married woman or to induce her to
separate from her husband. The Restatement does not seem to dis-
tinguish between advice and persuasion as does the English law, for in
England mere advice is not sufficient to ground the action. In both
systems one who reasonably believes that the wife is justified in leaving
her husband is privileged, although the Restatement places more
emphasis on the privilege of parents and other relatives than does the
158. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §695.
I59. [1932] 2 K. B. 497.
16o. 20 & 21 Vicr., c. 85, §§ 33, 59.
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English law. As there are so few English cases it is, however, danger-
ous to dogmatize on the subject.
Section 69o provides that a wife has the same rights in regard to
alienation of affections, separation, and criminal conversation as a
husband has. The English law similarly recognizes the equality of the
sexes, for a wife can sue a third person who induces her husband to
leave her.16 1  It may be noted, however, that the few actions which
have been brought in England under this heading have proved strik-
ingly unsuccessful.
In Section 693 a husband is given an action against one who has
caused tortious harm to his wife whereby he has been deprived of her
services or society. A similar cause of action is given to the husband
in English law, being part of the general principle under which the
master can recover for the loss of his servant's services. In consonance
with this principle American law holds that a wife cannot recover for
a tortious harm committed against her husband. 162 Although there is
some slight doubt on the subject, it is probable that the English courts
would reach the same conclusion.
16 3
Sections 696 and 697 state torts which are unknown to English
law, for under them a husband or wife may recover damages from one
who supplies habit-forming drugs to the other spouse, with knowledge
that it will be used in a way which will cause harm to the marital in-
terests. Habit-forming drugs do not include intoxicating liquor. It is
odd to find a tort as limited as this one: if the principle on which it
seems to be based is sound, why should it not cover any act which will
cause harm to the marital interests instead of being restricted to drugs?
RELATION OF PARENT AND CHILD
Perhaps no branch of the English law of torts is so out of touch
with modern thought as is that relating to parent and child, since it is
still based entirely on the master and servant relationship. Although
this is unfortunate from the standpoint of theory it does not seem to
have caused any real injustice in practice. The American law, on the
other hand, despite many vestigia of its origin, has succeeded in freeing
itself from some of the more obvious technicalities.
Section 700 states that it is a tort to abduct a minor child or to
induce it to leave its home. The parent can recover damages for the
161. Elliot v. Albert, [1934] I K. B. 65o.
162. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 695.
163. Although there is no precedent for such an action in English law, the learned
editor of Salmond remarks (p. 394) that "there seems no sufficient reason why at
the present day such an action should not lie". With all respect, we believe that
the historical origin of this rule is still too clear for the Courts to ignore it by ex-
tending a master's rights to the wife.
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loss of society of his child and for the emotional distress he has
suffered thereby. Damages for loss of service can also be recovered
but they are not an essential part of the tort. Strange to say English
law does not recognize abduction as a tort. If a parent's right to the
custody of his minor child is violated he can recover possession of it
only by means of a writ of habeas corpus or by an application to the
Chancery Division to exercise its power in respect of the guardianship
of infants. No action lies for the abduction itself; it is only in relation
to the loss of services that the parent, as master, can recover, with the
result that if the child is too young to give any services there is no
cause of action.'64
Section 701 deals with sexual intercourse with a minor female
child. Here the American law returns to the English principle that
the parent can recover only if he is entitled to the child's services. In
the caveat to this section the Institute expresses no opinion whether
there is a cause of action in the case of an unmarried adult daughter
living in her parent's home. In English law the only difference be-
tween adult and minor daughters is that as in the former case there is
no constructive service, the father must prove either de facto or con-
tractual service. The English rule is the logical one as the master may
lose the services of his servant by her seduction whether she be an
adult or a minor.
It is stated in Section 7o6 that it is a tort to obtain the services of
a minor child without the consent of the parent who is entitled to the
services. It is difficult to understand why the rule is stated in this way.
Under English law it is a tort to the parent-master to induce his
servant wrongfully to leave his employment. This tort does not depend
on the fact that the tort-feasor has himself obtained the services of
the child; whether the master could recover the value of those services
in an action of quasi-contract is an entirely separate question.
Section 707 is an interesting one. It provides that one who,
without the parent's consent, employs a minor child in an occupation
which is dangerous to it is liable to the parent for resulting harm.
This introduces a new principle, for, as the comment points out, the
parent can recover even though no tort has been committed against the
child. If the employer has not induced the child to leave his parent's
service, which is by itself a tort, it is difficult to see why the risk of the
employment should give the parent a cause of action. If a shipowner
in good faith employs a cabin boy, why should he be liable to the
parent, of whose existence he may be ignorant, merely because the
occupation is recognized to be dangerous?
164. Hall v. Hollander, (1825) 4 B. & C. 66o, 107 Eng. Rep. R. 12o6.
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INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS
The three sections which make up this division are startling for
the English lawyer to read as the first is so self-evident that it is difficult
to determine why it was thought necessary to state it at such length,
while the other two contain what at best can be described as novel
principles.
Section 7o8 states that one who engages in a business or occupa-
tion in good faith is not liable to another person for the loss so caused.
Four pages of comment are needed to explain this self-evident rule.
What can have induced the Institute to add the two illustrations at the
end? It is worth repeating illustration (I) here.165  "A operates a
bakery and employs a baker B. C, in good faith, opens a bakery in
competition with A. Because of the competition A is compelled to close
his bakery and B is unemployed for a year. C is not liable either to
A or to B." Can there be a single reader of the Restatement who has
ever doubted this conclusion? If any lawyer showed the temerity to
bring an action on this state of facts would he not be suspected of
feeble-mindedness?
On the other hand, Section 709 states a rule of law which is far
from self-evident. It provides that one who engages in a business
primarily for the purpose of causing loss to another and with the inten-
tion of terminating the business when that purpose is accomplished, is
liable to the other. This section seems to introduce the much disputed
continental doctrine of abuse of rights 166 into the common law in a
remarkable manner. It would be interesting to know how many cases
support this principle, for the number of instances of such unselfish
malevolence must be limited. Strange to say illustration (I) goes
fui-ther than the statement of the rule, for it omits the second part that
the business must be terminated after the destructive purpose has been
accomplished. Here a vindictive banker opens a barber shop next to
that of a barber with whom he has quarreled. The illustration says
that he is liable, although no reference is made to any intention to close
the banker's shop when it has succeeded in driving out its rival. As it
would now have all the trade it is unlikely that the banker would close
it. The strange result of this section is that a person who intends to
make a profit out of his malevolence will not be liable, while one who
is less optimistic is held to have committed a tort.
Section 710 is concerned with the wrong a person commits by
engaging in a business or in a profession in violation of a legislative
165. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §708, Illustration (i). Illustration (2) is
equally remarkable for its simplicity. It would be interesting to read the answers
if this were ever set as a problem in an examination paper.
166. See Gutteridge, note 156 supra.
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enactment. As these questions depend in each instance on the wording
of the particular statute it is difficult to state any general principles.
The English law is similar to the American law in holding that the
legislative grant of an exclusive franchise entitles the holder to a
remedy unless the enactment denies him a private remedy. There seems
to be no English case where the unauthorized practice of a profession
is regarded as a tort against the authorized members. The State by
licensing a profession is regarded as protecting the public and not as
conferring a private right on the members. The wrong is therefore a
public one.
CONFUSION OF SOURCE
In this chapter the Restatement deals with problems which in
English law are known as passing off, and infringement of trade-
mark or trade name. Whether the words "confusion of source" fur-
nish a particularly happy description of this situation is open to doubt.
Strange to say they are not included in the index where the references
are given under the traditional names.
Section 711 which deals with general principles includes in its
scope both fraudulent marketing (in English law this is described as
passing-off) and infringement of trade-marks. In the English text-
books it is usual to deal with the latter as a special subject and not as a
branch of the law of torts. There is much to be said for this arrange-
ment as the primary question in these cases is usually whether or not a
trade-mark exists, so that it is more in the nature of a question of
property than of tort. Apart from this point concerning classification,
the American rules seem to be almost identical with the English ones.
The interesting point is made in Section 712 that one may fraud-
ulently market one's services as well as one's goods as those of another.
It is doubtful whether in English law such an act would come under
the heading of passing-off; it is more likely that it would be dealt with
as a type of injurious falsehood.
Section 717 deals with the conditions of infringement of a trade
name or a trade-mark. In comment c it is said that "a person having a
trade-mark or trade name does not have the exclusive right to use the
designation which constitutes the trade-mark or trade name." In the
past this has also been the rule in England, but in the recent case of
Bismag Ltd. v. Amblins (Chemists) Ltd.17 the majority of the Court
of Appeal reached the astonishing conclusion that Parliament had
altered this, apparently per incuriant, by s.4 of the Trade Marks Act,
167. [1940] I Ch. 667.
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1938.168 Until the House of Lords gets an opportunity of considering
this question, the English law therefore is that the owner of a trade-
mark has a form of copyright in it so that he can prevent the owner of
a competing article from referring to it by name.
Concerned with the imitation of the physical appearance of goods,
Section 741 seems to include under one heading two entirely separate
ideas: first, an imitation made for the purpose of passing off the de-
fendant's goods as those of the plaintiff and, second, an imitation made
for the purpose of adopting some useful feature which the plaintiff
has developed. English text-books do not deal with these together, as
they are based on different principles, and the facts on which liability
is based are not the same. Thus, in the first case, it is necessary to
prove that the prospective purchaser has been or may be misled, while
this is entirely immaterial in the second.
169
Comment f to Section 749 points out that in the United States a
trade-mark or trade name may not be assigned in gross, that is, without
a transfer of any portion of the business in which it is used. This is
explained on the ground that the interest in a trade-mark or trade name
is protected because it identifies the goods as coming from a particular
source and purchasers rely on it. The English law, on the other hand,
regards a trade-mark rather as being in the nature of property, Section
7 of the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 1937 170 providing: "Not-
withstanding any rule of law or equity to the contrary, a registered
trade-mark shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, assign-
able and transmissible either in connection with the goodwill of a
business or not." Although the American rule seems to give more
protection to the general public, this may really be illusory as is shown
by comment c of Section 756. Here a distributor, who has his own
trade-mark, liquidates his business, and becomes an employee of B's
to whom he assigns his trade-mark. According to the Restatement
"the symbol may therefore be transferred as an incident of that em-
ployment", but nothing is said as to how long the employment must
continue. It may end almost immediately, but the trade-mark will
continue to be held by B.
168. I & 2 GEO. VI, c. 22.
169. Section 742 provides that a feature of goods is functional under Section
741, if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of
processing, handling or using them. This distinction between functional and non-
functional features is a difficult one to make, especially where a design is merely a
question of taste. A more practical and important distinction, which the Restatement
does not stress, seems to be between those features which are part of the essential
character of the thing itself, and those which merely are of use as identifying the
origin of the goods.
170. 1 EDW. VIII and i GEo. VI, C. 49.
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CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this Article it was said that this comparison
of English and American law would show that in no one of the topics
covered by the Restatement was there any serious divergence between
the two systems. It is believed that no point which might have sug-
gested the opposite has been omitted, but there may be some minor
differences which have not been noted. Occasionally it has even been
felt that the differences were less marked than they seemed because in
some instances the Institute has apparently taken a more advanced step
than some of the American courts have adopted. What then is the
moral of this story? Two deductions may be tentatively suggested,
remembering always that this material is so limited that no definite
inferences can be based upon it. The first is that once given certain
fundamental principles, then what Mr. Justice Cardozo has called the
method of logical progression 171 seems to be of vital force. There is
no other way of explaining how American and English law, starting
from the same general principles have reached almost the same results
in spite of fundamental political, social and economic differences. The
second lesson is that too much emphasis must not be placed on the
power of the judge to mould the law to accord with his idea of justice.
The American law seems to contain the same anachronisms, the same
distinctions based solely on historical grounds, the same technicalities
as does the English. If we teach that these can be swept away by
judicial legislation then we are misleading with a false hope for, as
this study has shown, the judges in practice do not seem to be willing
to exercise so revolutionary a power. In the twentieth century as in
the nineteenth the teaching of Jeremy Bentham remains true-adequate
reform of the law can come only through the legislature.
II. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 30.
